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I.

ISSUE AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A.

Issue∗

The language of Article 2 of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (“ECCC”) Statute defines the competence of the court as being over those who
were “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea” and those who were “most responsible”
for atrocities during the Democratic Kampuchea regime. This language raises two
important issues: (1) whether this is limiting language of jurisdiction, and if so (2) what
the terms “senior leaders” and “most responsible” mean?
The hybrid tribunals face a uniquely difficult task in interpreting new language
defining their competence. The ad-hoc tribunals and the International Criminal Court
(“ICC”) are limited mostly by subject-matter and temporal restrictions. The Special
Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) has yet to make a final decision on how to apply the
term “greatest responsibility” to the individual accused. The ECCC will face an equally
daunting task in interpreting the new “most responsible” language.
In order to determine the meaning of the language used in Article 2, it is necessary
to compare the versions of personal jurisdiction used in the various tribunals, including
the ICC, ad-hoc tribunals, and the SCSL. By comparing the ECCC’s language to the
spectrum of jurisdiction created by the other tribunals, it will become clear how best to
interpret the language.

∗

Article 2 of the ECCC Statute states that the Extraordinary Chambers shall be established to bring to trial
senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes
committed…during the period 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979. Do the terms “senior leaders” and “persons
most responsible” limit the Extraordinary Chambers jurisdiction to bring to trial only those individuals
falling in those categories? More significantly, what is the meaning of these two terms? Discuss (Here
reference should be made to other international or hybrid tribunals, especially Sierra Leone).

1

B.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
1.

The Language in Article 2 of the ECCC Statute Defines the
Personal Jurisdiction of the ECCC.

The phrases “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea” and those “most
responsible” refer to the personal jurisdiction of the ECCC. As such, they act first as a
guide to the prosecutor. However, while they are not an element of any crime, they do
define the jurisdiction of the court. If an accused does not fall into one of these
categories, the ECCC does not have competence to try him. The chambers will have to
decide not only the interpretation of these words, but also whether an individual accused
falls into one of these categories.
Initially, this matter must be addressed at the preliminary hearing. It is best to
specifically identify an accused as falling into one or both of these categories in the
indictment in order to avoid challenges. The matter can again be addressed during a
motion for acquittal after the prosecution case closes. The final determination will be
considered and decided upon during the judgment.
2.

The Phrase “Senior Leaders” Refers to the Top Level of
Command in the Democratic Kampuchea, but is Limited to Those
who Bear Command Responsibility.

The phrase “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea” has three elements. An
individual must be senior, or high ranking. In the case of the Democratic Kampuchea,
this probably means they were a member of the Central Committee. They must also be a
leader, which suggests that they hold command responsibility for atrocities that happened
under their control. Finally, they must be a member of Democratic Kampuchea. Any
non-member, or member of a separate group cannot be included in this category.

2

3.

The Phrase “Most Responsible” Allows for the Prosecution of
Lower Ranking Leaders of Democratic Kampuchea Leaders Who
Are Still Criminally Liable.

The phrase “most responsible” is a limiting phrase of personal jurisdiction.
Compared with the other international criminal tribunals, it is narrower than the ICC and
ad-hoc tribunals, but broader than the SCSL’s “greatest responsibility” language.
The term is most likely intended to allow for the prosecution of lower level
commanders within the Democratic Kampuchea government. While the language itself
is fairly broad, and leaves the prosecutor with a wide scope of discretion, there may be
other factors to consider. It is still probably limited to members of the Democratic
Kampuchea, and the financial and political limitations of the ECCC.1 The Todovic test,
developed in the ICTY, is the best tool in determining whether an individual can be
considered most responsible.
II.

ARTICLE 2 AS PERSONAL JURISDICTION
There are four main types of jurisdiction to consider in an international criminal

tribunal: personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, temporal jurisdiction, and
territorial jurisdiction. The tribunal must have competence over all four jurisdictional
elements in order to try an accused.
The ECCC’s subject-matter jurisdiction is defined in Articles 3-8 of the ECCC
Statute. These provisions enumerate the crimes for which an individual can be tried in
the ECCC. The temporal jurisdiction is simply the time period during which the crimes
must have been committed for the ECCC to have jurisdiction. In this case, the ECCC has

1

See DRAFT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA
CONCERNING THE PROSECUTION UNDER CAMBODIA LAW OF CRIMES COMMITTED DURING THE PERIOD OF
DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA, G.A. Res. 57/228, U.N. GOAR, 57th Sess., ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/Res/57/228B (22
May 2003) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

3

temporal jurisdiction is between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979.2 The territorial
jurisdiction defines the geographical scope of the court’s jurisdiction. The ECCC Statute
does not specify a territorial limitation.
Personal jurisdiction is the court’s power to bring an individual person into its
adjudicative process.3 Personal jurisdiction in the international criminal tribunals is
limited by the seriousness of the crime and the practical limitations of the tribunal.4 In
the case of the ECCC and the SCSL, it is explicitly stated in the terms of the respective
statutes.5
Article 2 of the Extraordinary Chambers of Cambodia Statute (“ECCC Statute”)
reads:
Extraordinary Chambers shall be established in the existing court structure, namely the
trial court and the supreme court to bring to trial senior leaders of Democratic
Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations
of Cambodian laws related to crimes, international humanitarian law and custom, and
international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were committed during the
period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.

The particular phrase “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were
most responsible for the crime,” defines the limits of the ECCC’s personal jurisdiction.6
An indictee must fall within one of these two categories to be tried before the ECCC.

2

LAW ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA FOR THE
PROSECUTION OF CRIMES COMMITTED DURING THE PERIOD OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA, Arts. 2, Reach
Kret No. NS/RKM/1004/006 (27 Oct. 2004) (hereinafter “ECCC Statute”) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
3

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004), personal jurisdiction [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 56].
4

David J. Scheffer, The Future of Atrocity Law, 25 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 389, 417 (Summer 2002)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 49].

5

6

Id.
ECCC Statute, supra note 2 at Art. 2 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5].

4

The SCSL Statute contains similar limiting language. Article 1 of the SCSL Statute
reads:
The Special Court shall…have the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra
Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996,
including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the
establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.7

The term “greatest responsibility” closely echoes the terms “senior leaders” and
“most responsible” in the ECCC Statute. Early on, the prosecutor of the SCSL argued
that this language was simply a guide to the prosecution as they exercised their
discretion.8 This argument was based on documents establishing the SCSL. In
particular, the United Nations (“U.N.”) Secretary-General had argued in his report on the
establishment of the SCSL that the language should be a guide to the prosecutor, and
specifically stated that it should not be understood as a jurisdictional threshold.9
The SCSL chambers rejected the argument that the language was simply a
prosecutorial guide. It read the language “greatest responsibility” to be a description of
personal jurisdiction. As such, it could guide the prosecutor, but it is not limited to
prosecutorial discretion.10 In deciding this, the court paid particular attention to the
7

STATUTE OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, Art. 1 (2000) (hereinafter “SCSL Statute”)
(emphasis added) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]. Compare the “greatest
responsibility” language of the SCSL, the “senior leaders” and “most responsible” language of the ECCC
and the broad “those responsible” language used in establishing a governing body in East Timor; see U.N.
SCOR, 54th Sess., 4057th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1272 (25 Oct. 1999) [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 15].
8

See Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary
Defence Motion on the Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Filed on Behalf of Accused Fofana, ¶ 5 (3 March
2004) (hereinafter “SCSL Fofana Decision”) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32].

9

The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for
Sierra Leone, delivered to the Security Council, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (4 Oct. 2000) [reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 6].
10

SCSL Fofana Decision, ¶ 27.
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Security Council’s interpretation of “greatest responsibility” as a jurisdictional
threshold.11
While the phrase “greatest responsibility” was held to be a description of personal
jurisdiction, other sections of the same paragraph were not. The later section of Article 1
reads, “including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the
establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.”12 The court
held that this language was solely a guide to the prosecutor and not an element of
personal jurisdiction.13 Again, the court looked to the correspondence between the
Secretary-General and the Security Council for guidance. Both agreed that this was not
language defining competence, but rather a guide to the prosecutor.14 The court found
that due to this agreement, the SCSL Statute was amended and approved by the
government of Sierra Leone.15 Thus, this overrode any argument that the language
described the personal jurisdiction of the court.16

11

Letter from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/2001/95 (31 Jan.
2001) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 59].

12

This language was used in considering the indictment of Augustine Gbao. Gbao was a mid-level
commander in the RUF, but let led the operation that kidnapped and killed U.N. personnel, thus
“impeding” the peace process. See Prosecutor v. Issa Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL-04-15-PT, Corrected
Amended Consolidated Indictment (2 August 2006) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25].
13

SCSL Fofana Decision, supra note 8 at ¶¶ 24-25 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32].

14

See Letter from the Secretary General to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/40 (12
Jan. 2001) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 61]; and the response at Letter from the
President of the Security Council to the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/2001/95 (31 Jan. 2001)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 59].

15

See Letter from the Secretary General to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/693 (12
July 2001) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 62].

16

SCSL Fofana Decision, supra note 8 at ¶ 26.
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Possibly guiding the ECCC is the Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia
(“Group of Experts”).17 The Group of Experts argued that the terms “senior leaders” and
“most responsible” should be understood solely as a guide for the prosecutor.18 The
report suggested that the ECCC should define its personal jurisdiction using the phrase,
“persons responsible for serious violations of human rights committed in Cambodia,”
similar to the jurisdictions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”).19
However, as the SCSL rejected the Secretary-General’s suggestions in this matter,
so the ECCC seems to have rejected the Group of Experts’ suggestion. The Cambodian
Government continued to draft the language of the ECCC Statute counter to the Group of
Experts’ recommendation.20 In the agreement between the Government of Cambodia and
the U.N. General Assembly, the language specifically identifies the terms “senior
leaders” and “most responsible” as the personal jurisdiction of the court.21 In fact, Article
2 of the ECCC Statute specifically falls under Chapter II, entitled, “COMPETENCE”.
For this reason, the SCSL’s holding that the language is a description of jurisdiction
should carry more weight in determining the meaning of “senior leaders” and “most

17

Group of Experts for Cambodia, REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS FOR CAMBODIA ESTABLISHED
PURSUANT TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 52/135, delivered to the Security Council and the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/1999/231, A/53/850 (16 March 1999) (hereinafter “Group of Experts”) [reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
18

Id. at ¶ 111.

19

Id. at ¶ 154.

20

See ECCC Statute, supra note 2 at Arts. 1-2 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5].

21

DRAFT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA
CONCERNING THE PROSECUTION UNDER CAMBODIA LAW OF CRIMES COMMITTED DURING THE PERIOD OF
DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA, G.A. Res. 57/228, U.N. GOAR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/57/228B (22 May
2003) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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responsible”. The SCSL’s decisions regarding “greatest responsibility”, along with the
wording and position of the terms “senior leaders” and “most responsible” within the
ECCC Statute, suggest that they are words of personal jurisdiction, not solely
prosecutorial guidance.
As terms of personal jurisdiction, the words “senior leaders” and “most
responsible” limit the ECCC’s competence to bring to trial only those individuals falling
within those categories.

A.

CONSIDERATIONS OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION DURING THE
TRIAL PROCESS

Though a court cannot adjudicate an individual unless it has jurisdiction, the issue
of whether the court has jurisdiction can often be complicated. If a court does not have
jurisdiction over a person, then it cannot proceed with the trial. However, issues of
jurisdiction often require factual submissions to determine whether the court has
competence. Especially in the matter of international criminal tribunals, these factual
submissions may be as extensive as would be submitted in the trial itself.
The ICTY has consistently held that jurisdictional matters requiring factual
submissions are to be dealt with at the trial stage, rather than the preliminary stages.22
The SCSL has also held that the ultimate analysis of personal jurisdiction is an
evidentiary matter to be determined at the trial stage.23

22

See e.g., Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskić, Case No. IT-95-15, Decision Rejecting a Motion of the Defence
to Dismiss Counts 4, 7, 10, 14, 16, and 18 based on the Failure to Adequately Plead the Existence of an
International Armed Conflict, ¶ 7 (4 April 1997) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 35];
and Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajiśnik, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Decision on Motion Challenging
Jurisdiction – with Reasons, ¶ 25 (22 September 2000) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
29].

23

SCSL Fofana Decision, supra note 8 at ¶ 44 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
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The SCSL initially considers the issue during the preliminary hearing. According
to Rule 47 of the SCSL Statute, the prosecutor must make out an indictment which
includes the name of the suspect, a statement of the charged offenses, and particulars of
the offenses. The indictment must also include a case summary.24
Thereafter, a judge must be satisfied that (1) the indictment charges the accused
with a crime within the jurisdiction of the SCSL and (2) the case summary, if proven,
amounts to a crime particularized in the indictment.25 This judicial review must take into
account the personal, substantive, temporal, and territorial limits on the court’s
jurisdiction.26
In nine of the indictments before the SCSL, the reviewing judge explicitly found
that the indictments showed sufficient grounds for believing the accused “has committed
crimes within the jurisdiction of the court.”27 The court found this sufficient to show that
the reviewing magistrate was satisfied that there was some evidence of jurisdiction. Even
in a decision that did not use this language to accept an indictment, the SCSL held that

24

SCSL Statute, supra note 7 at Art. 47(C) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
Compare to the ECCC which requires a submission of the suspect’s name, a summary of the facts, the
offences charged, the relevant law and the crimes, and dates with signatures of both Co-Prosecutors;
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, DRAFT INTERNAL RULES, Rule 57 (3 Nov. 2006)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

25

Id. at art. 47(E).

26

SCSL Fofana Decision, ¶ 31 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32].

27

See e.g., Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-11-I, Decision Approving the Indictment and
Order for Non-Disclosure (7 March 2003) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21]; and
Prosecutor v. Issa Sessay, Case No. SCSL-03-05-I, Decision Approving the Indictment and Order for NonDisclosure (7 March 2003) (emphasis added) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
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the simple fact that the reviewing judge approved the indictment meant that he must have
been satisfied that the jurisdictional requirements were met.28
During the pre-trial review of the indictment, the SCSL has held that the standard of
review for personal jurisdiction issues should be the same for subject-matter jurisdiction
issues: the judge must be satisfied that there is sufficient information to provide
reasonable grounds that the accused is a person who bears the greatest responsibility for
the crimes.29
The issue of jurisdiction may be brought again at the motion for acquittal stage.
When the prosecution case has rested, the defence may bring a motion for acquittal. The
court may consider jurisdictional challenges again at this point.30 During the motion for
acquittal stage of the AFRC trial at the SCSL, the defence argued that the term “greatest
responsibility” amounted to a jurisdictional limitation, and as such, the prosecution must
have produced evidence sufficient to show the accused bore the greatest responsibility.31
The court agreed that the prosecution must produce evidence to show the accused bore
the greatest responsibility, but rejected the defence’s argument that evidence of others
bearing the greatest responsibility would lessen the accused’s own culpability.32

28

SCSL Fofana Decision, ¶ 36.

29

Id. at ¶ 38.

30

Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Defence Motions for
Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98, ¶ 31 (31 March 2006) [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 17].

31

Id. at ¶ 31.

32

Id. at ¶¶ 38-39.
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The SCSL has held that the standard of review for a motion of acquittal must be
granted if the prosecution’s evidence “could” not support a conviction of one or more
counts.33 A full extensive review of the accused’s guilt is not necessary.34
The final determination of the court’s competence will ultimately arise during the
judgment stage. The ECCC’s Rule 97 specifically requires the judgment to include a
finding whether the accused falls within the jurisdiction of the court.35 The SCSL has yet
to file a judgment in any of its cases, so a final application of the phrase “greatest
responsibility” has yet to be decided.36
III.

THE SPECTRUM OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The personal jurisdiction of the ECCC did not arise in a vacuum. The expression

was carefully selected to distinguish it from the phraseology of the other tribunals. The
different statutes of the various international criminal tribunals have established different
levels of competence for each court and different descriptions of their personal
jurisdiction. The statutes and case law of these courts have created a spectrum of
personal jurisdiction to which the ECCC can look for guidance. Through an analysis of
the jurisdiction of the various courts, the spectrum becomes recognizable.
33

The rule reads, “If, after the close of the case for the prosecution, the evidence is such that no reasonable
tribunal or fact could be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt on one or more counts of
the indictment, the Trial Chamber shall enter a judgment of acquittal on those counts.” Special Court for
Sierra Leone, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, adopted 16 Jan. 2002, amended 14 March 2004, Rule
98 (4th rev.) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11].

34

Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on Motions for Judgment of
Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98, ¶¶ 42-45 (21 October 2005) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 31].

35

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, DRAFT INTERNAL RULES, Rule 97(3) (3 Nov. 2006)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

36

Judgments for the AFRC and CDF trials in the SCSL are expected very soon, but were not released as of
the time of writing.
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A.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

The ICC has the broadest personal jurisdiction of all the international criminal
tribunals. Article 1 of the Rome Statute gives the court “power to exercise its jurisdiction
over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern.”37 The crimes referred
to are enumerated in the Rome Statute and define the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
ICC.38
Article 25 provides the court “jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the
Statute.”39 Article 26 limits the competence of the court, prohibiting the prosecution of
children under the age of 18 (at the time of the crime).40 These broad definitions give the
court has jurisdiction over almost anyone so long as they fall within the subject-matter
and temporal jurisdictional requirements, and are adults.
However, the personal jurisdiction of the ICC is limited by the treaty obligations
and procedural steps to initiate prosecution. Article 12 states that the ICC only has
personal jurisdiction if the crime was committed within the territory of a member state, or
the accused is a national of a member state. Non-member states may also temporarily
accept ICC jurisdiction for a particular crime.41 Thus, the ICC only has personal
jurisdiction if the accused is associated with a Rome Statute member state.

37

ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, Art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (17 July
1998) (hereinafter “Rome Statute”) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
38

Id. at Arts. 5-8.

39

Id. at Art. 25.

40

Id. at Art. 26.

41

Id. at Art. 12.
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One aspect that differentiates the ICC from other international criminal tribunals is
the way personal jurisdiction is related to the procedures used to initiate an investigation.
Article 12 controls where the prosecutor initiates an investigation proprio motu or a State
refers a situation to the prosecutor.42 If that individual is not connected to a Rome Statute
member State, the ICC as an organization cannot force the State in which the
investigation would take place to cooperate if that State has not consented to be bound.43
In other words, the ICC has no power over a non-member State. If the prosecution is to
proceed, it can only do so within the confines of Article 12.
However, when the Security Council refers a case it can use its power to force any
U.N. member State to cooperate.44 Since Security Council resolutions are binding on all
U.N. members, the Security Council could legally bind a U.N. member State to cooperate
with the ICC, even if that State is not party to the Rome Statute.45
Thus, the ICC has no personal jurisdiction over an individual who is not associated
with a Rome Statute member State, unless the Security Council refers the situation to the
ICC.46 But if the Security Council is willing to act along with the ICC, then the ICC
effectively has universal personal jurisdiction.47

42

Id. at Art. 12.

43

Kenneth S. Gallant, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Jurisdiction to Prescribe in International Criminal
Courts, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 763, 801 (2003) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 40].

44

The Security Council has the option to refer cases to the Prosecutor of the ICC. See Rome Statute, supra
note 33 at Art. 13(b). Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council also has the power to
make resolutions that are binding on all UN member states.
45

46

47

Gallant, supra note 39, at 801.
Id.
Id. at 820.
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Much of the confusion arising from the ICC’s personal jurisdiction comes from the
fact that there are no solid geographical restrictions to the ICC’s jurisdiction. As will be
seen below, that is not the case with the ad-hoc or hybrid tribunals.
B.

THE AD-HOC TRIBUNALS

The ad-hoc tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR, share a similar phraseology in regards to
their personal jurisdiction. The tribunals have “the power to prosecute persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law.”48 On its face, this
jurisdiction still seems incredibly broad, but each tribunal has other rules and limitations
that control their personal jurisdiction as well.
1.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

Articles 6 and 7 of the ICTY Statute add to the jurisdictional definition provided in
Article 1. Article 6 states that the court has jurisdiction over natural persons.49 As such,
the court does not have competence over juridical persons, such as associations or
organizations.50 The ICTY also does not prosecute members of ethnic groups based on
their ethnicity.51 This limitation of personal jurisdiction to natural persons is modeled on
the practice of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremburg (“IMT”).52

48

See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, adopted 25
May 1993, amended 28 Feb. 2006, Art. 1 (8th rev.) (hereinafter “ICTY Statute”) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 12]; and STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA, adopted 8 Nov. 1994, amended 26 March 2004, Art. 1 (8th rev.) (hereinafter “ICTR Statute”)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
49

ICTY Statute, Art. 6.

50

The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), delivered to the Security Council, ¶¶ 50-51, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (3 May 1993)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

51

The Secretary-General, Second Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, ¶ 196,
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The Secretary-General has confirmed that an important element of personal
jurisdiction is the principle of individual criminal responsibility.53 Article 7 defines
individual criminal responsibility for the ICTY, providing the court jurisdiction over any
“person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted” one
of the subject-matter crimes of the ICTY.54 This may include both military personnel and
civilians.
This issue of individual criminal responsibility was considered by the Appeals
Chamber in Tadic.55 In Tadic, the defence argued that individual criminal responsibility
does not apply during internal armed conflicts.56 In deciding the case, the court looked to
the IMT. The IMT considered three factors to determine individual criminal
responsibility: (1) the clear and unequivocal recognition of the rules of warfare; (2) State
practice indicating intent to criminalize those who breach the rules of warfare; and (3)

U.N. Doc. S/1995/728, A/50/365 (23 Aug. 1995) (prepared by Antonio Cassese, President of the ICTY)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8].
52

M. Cherif Bassiouni, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA 303 (Transnational Publishers, 1996) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 51].
See also AGREEMENT FOR THE PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS OF THE
EUROPEAN AXIS, AND CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, Arts. 9-10, 82 U.N.T.S. 280
(entered into force 8 Aug. 1945) (hereinafter “IMT Charter”) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 1].
53

The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), delivered to the Security Council, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (3 May 1993)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

54

ICTY Statute, supra note 48 at Art. 7(1) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 40].

55

Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction (2 October 1995) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24].

56

Id. at ¶ 65.
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punishment of violations by national courts and military tribunals.57 The ICTY adopted
these criteria to determine individual criminal responsibility.58
In its analysis, the court held that individual criminal responsibility is not strictly
limited to the definition found in Article 7 of the ICTY Statute. The court is not limited
to prosecuting only those who materially perform the criminal acts, but also those whose
actions enabled the perpetrators to carry out the acts.59
The words “serious violations” within the ICTY Statute could also raise personal
jurisdiction issues. One interpretation is that the words “serious violations” were meant
to limit the individual criminal responsibility to leaders and commanders. The argument
has been made in relation to contempt charges. The defence in Jovic argued that he could
not be tried for contempt because contempt was not a “serious violation of international
humanitarian law” and thus, the court had no personal jurisdiction over him.60 The court
agreed that contempt was not a “serious violation” of international humanitarian law, but
never addressed whether “serious violation” was indeed a matter of personal jurisdiction.
The court held that it has a separate and inherent power to prosecute contempt.61
It is likely that the phrase “serious violations” relates to the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the court. Since the enumerated crimes are already considered “serious
57

Id. at ¶¶ 128-129.

58

Id. at ¶¶ 128-129. The Appeals Chamber held that all of these criteria applied to the current situation and
thus to internal armed conflicts. For this reason, individual criminal responsibility applied to the conflict in
Yugoslavia.
59

Id. at ¶¶ 191-193.

60

Prosecutor v. Josip Jovic, Case No. IT-95-14 & 14/2-R77, Decision to Deny the Accused Josip Jovic’s
Preliminary Motion to Dismiss the Indictment on the Grounds of Lack of Jurisdiction and Defects in the
Form of the Indictment, ¶ 7 (21 December 2005) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 28].

61

Id. at ¶¶ 9-10.
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violations of international humanitarian law” any challenge to this section of the ICTY
Statute would be related to subject-matter.
The argument that “serious violations” relates to personal jurisdiction is unlikely to
be upheld, and has yet to be seriously challenged in the court. If the drafters of the ICTY
Statute had intended to limit the jurisdiction to high level leaders and commanders, they
would likely have made it clearer, perhaps by using the “major war criminals” language
used in the IMT62 or by using the phrase “senior leaders” like in the ECCC.63
The ICTY’s jurisprudence suggests that its personal jurisdiction is very broad. It
extends to any individual that committed or aided serious violations of international
humanitarian law. Due to the wide scope of personal jurisdiction exercised by the ICTY,
serious challenges rarely arise.
2.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

Article 5 of the ICTR Statute is identical to Article 6 of the ICTY Statute.64 Like
the ICTY, the ICTR only has jurisdiction over natural persons, and not organizations.65

62

M. Cherif Bassiouni, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA 297-301 (Transnational Publishers, 1996) (citing IMT Charter, Art. 6) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 51].
63

ECCC Statute, supra note 2 at Art. 2 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5].

64

Both courts identically state that they have “jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the provisions
of the present Statute.” See ICTR Statute, supra note 48 at Art. 5 [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 13]; and ICTY Statute, supra note 48 at Art. 6 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 40].
65

See John R.W.D. Jones, THE PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA 500 (Second ed., Transnational Publishers 2000) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 53].
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And, like the ICTY, the personal jurisdiction of the ICTR extends to civilians as well as
combatants.66
The ICTR Statute also defines its competence as over “those responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law.”67 The ICTR does not express a limitation
with respect to the level of responsibility of the accused, but there is a focus on those who
are responsible for genocide.68
The ICTR has taken a slightly different approach to analyzing personal jurisdiction
than the ICTY. The ICTR considers two distinct issues in determining personal
jurisdiction: the class of the perpetrators, and the class of the victims.69
i.

The Perpetrators

In determining the class of the perpetrators, the ICTR limits its jurisdiction
according to nationality.70 Article 1 of the ICTR Statute gives the court personal
jurisdiction over those who committed crimes in Rwanda, as well as Rwandan citizens
who committed crimes in neighboring States.71 Thus, the court has jurisdiction over
three classes of perpetrators: (1) Rwandan citizens committing crimes in Rwanda; (2)
Rwandan citizens committing crimes outside Rwanda; and (3) Non-Rwandan individuals
66

Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu., Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 634 (2 September 1998)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27].

67

ICTR Statute, supra note 48 at Art. 1 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13].

68

William A. Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and
Sierra Leone 147 (Cambridge University Press 2006) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
54].

69

Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema., Case No. ICTR-96-13, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 263 (27 January 2000)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19].

70

Schabas, supra note 68 at 142.

71

ICTR Statute, supra note 48 at Art. 1.
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committing crimes within Rwanda. Noticeably absent are non-Rwandan citizens
committing crimes outside of Rwanda, even if they may be related to the conflict. The
court does not have jurisdiction over this class of perpetrators.72
Neither the ICTY nor the ICC is limited in this way. In fact, in 1999 the Prosecutor
of the ICTY indicated her intent to investigate NATO personnel. Though this never
produced any indictments, it is clear that there would be no jurisdictional problem so long
as there was a territorial link to the former Yugoslavia.73
ii.

The Victims

The victims of the conflict must be those “not taking an active part in the
hostilities,”74 as described in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The court
accepts a negative definition of civilians to be anyone that is not a combatant. Being so
broadly defined, it is left to the court to determine the class of victims on a case-by-case
basis.75

72

Norman G. Printer, Jr., Establishing an International Criminal Tribunal for Iraq: The Time is Now, 36
UWLA L. Rev. 27, 48 (2005) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 47]. The investigations
ended up being ‘inconclusive’ and when another prosecutor was appointed, the matter was dropped; see
Luc Côté, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law, 3 J. Int’l
Crim. Just. 162, 181-182 (March 2005) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 39].

73

Schabas, supra note 68 at 142 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 54].

74

Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu., Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 629 (2 September 1998)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27].

75

Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema., Case No. ICTR-96-13, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 280 (27 January 2000)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19]. See also Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema et al.,
Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement, ¶ 180 (21 May 1999) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 22].
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3.

Rule 11 bis of the ICTY Statute

The ICTY’s Rule 11 bis was adopted in November 1997 and amended in September
2002.76 The rule allows for the transfer of defendants from the ICTY to the national
courts after a referral bench considers the gravity of the crimes charged and the level of
responsibility of the accused.77 The rule was part of a broader strategy to ensure the
completion of all ICTY trials by 2008.78
In determining a referral, the referral bench must consider the completion strategy
as summarized by Security Council Resolution 1503 (2003), which states that all future
ICTY activities must concentrate on the “prosecution and trial of the most senior leaders
suspected of being most responsible for crimes within the ICTY’s jurisdiction” and
transfer all others to the national courts.79 While not a jurisdictional element, the ICTY’s
interpretation of the Rule 11 bis language considerably aids an interpretation of the
ECCC’s jurisdiction.

76

ICTY Statute, supra note 48 at Rule 11 bis [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 40].

77

Id. at Rule 11 bis (C) and Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT, Decision on
Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 19-23 (8 July 2005) [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 23]. Compare this to the Secretary General’s interpretation of “most responsible” noted
above which included a determination of the severity of the crime or the massiveness of its scale: The
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone, delivered to the Security Council, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (4 Oct. 2000) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 6].
78

See Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/Prst/2002/21 (23 July 2002)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 64]; and U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4240th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/Res/1329 (5 Dec. 2000) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 16].

79

S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (28 Aug. 2003) (emphasis added) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 10]. The ICTY also modified the language of Rule 28 to reflect the
language of Resolution 1503; see Luc Côté, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in
International Criminal Law, 3 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 162, 185-186 (March 2005) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 39].
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In Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic, the referral bench considered the gravity of
the crimes charged and the level of responsibility of the accused in holding that the
accused should not be referred because he was a most senior leader that was most
responsible for the crimes.80 The court considered the gravity of the crimes: a fifteen
month campaign that killed and wounded thousands of civilians.81 It also found that the
accused had a high level of command responsibility because he was subordinate only to
the highest military commanders.82 He was in command of about 18,000 men, and the
fact that he joined an already established campaign did not diminish his responsibility.83
More importantly, the referral bench rejected the prosecution’s interpretation of the
phrase, “most senior leaders.” The prosecution submitted that the words apply where the
accused was “the architect of the overall policy underpinning the alleged crimes and
driving their commission.”84 The referral bench rejected this narrow interpretation, and
instead held that “most senior leaders” covers those who, “by virtue of their position and
function in the relevant hierarchy, both de jure and de facto, are alleged to have exercised
such a degree of authority that it is appropriate to describe them as among the ‘most
senior’, rather than ‘intermediate’.”85

80

Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to
Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 19-23 (8 July 2005) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23].

81

Id. at ¶ 19.

82

Id. at ¶ 23.

83

84

85

Id.
Id. at ¶ 22.
Id.
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In Prosecutor v. Todovic,86 the Appeals Chamber formulated four factors to
consider when deciding a ruling under Rule 11 bis:
(1) The temporal scope of the crimes charged. The court should consider the
amount of time that the accused committed the charged crime as one of several
relevant factors.87
(2) The geographic scope of the crimes charged. The geographic scope, or how
wide the physical area was in which the crime took place.88
(3) The accused’s position. Whether the accused was a “most senior leader” or was
just an “intermediary actor”.89
(4) The number of persons affected by the crimes charged. How many people
were victimized by the accused’s actions.90
The referral bench used these factors to determine that the accused Todovic was a proper
candidate for referral. Though the bench agreed that the accused need not be the architect
of the overall policy to be considered a “most senior leader”, it ultimately held that in this
case the accused was just an intermediary actor.91
In Prosecutor v. Kovacevic, the court used the Todovic test when it referred the
accused to the national courts. The referral bench found that the Accused was just a
86

Prosecutor v. Savo Todovic, Case No. IT-97-25/1, Decision on Savo Todovic’s Appeal Against
Decisions on Referral Under Rule 11bis (4 September 2006) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 34].

87

Id. at ¶ 13.

88

Id. at ¶ 16.

89

Id. at ¶¶ 17-22.

90

Id. at ¶¶ 23-26.

91

Id. at ¶¶ 21-22.
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battalion commander following orders, and two higher senior leaders had already been
convicted for their roles in the crimes. Therefore, the accused was not a “most senior
leader.”92
The ICTY’s analysis of the terms “most senior leaders” and “most responsible” is
very useful in analyzing the personal jurisdiction of the ECCC.
C.

THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

Article 1 of the SCSL Statute reads:
The Special Court shall…have the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra
Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996,
including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the
establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.93

The SCSL has discussed the meaning of the term “greatest responsibility” extensively.
The court has recognized that “greatest responsibility” refers to the court’s personal
jurisdiction.94 It has also emphasized the distinction between “greatest responsibility”
and the language of the ad-hoc tribunals.
1.

Interpretation in the U.N. and SCSL

In determining the meaning of “greatest responsibility”, the SCSL has paid special
attention to the correspondence between the U.N. Secretary-General and the President of
the Security Council during the negations to establish the SCSL.

92

Prosecutor v. Vladimir Kovacevic, Case No. IT-01-42/2-1, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to
Rule 11 bis with Confidential and Partly Ex Parte Annexes, ¶ 20 (17 November 2006) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 36].

93

SCSL Statute, supra note 7 at Art. 1 (emphasis added) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
14].

94

SCSL Fofana Decision, supra note 8 at ¶ 27 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
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Initially, the Secretary-General, in his report on the establishment of the SCSL,
advocated for the use of the phrase “most responsible” to define the court’s jurisdiction.95
The Security Council rejected this proposal, opting for the term “greatest
responsibility”.96 In so doing, the Security Council believed it would be “limiting the
focus of the Special Court to those who played a leadership role.”97 In a later letter, the
Secretary-General agreed with this interpretation.98 The Security Council overrode the
Secretary-General and the “greatest responsibility” was adopted into the SCSL Statute.
In their correspondence, both the Security Council and the Secretary-General
agreed that “greatest responsibility” did not limit the court’s jurisdiction solely to
political and military leaders.99 But the fact that the individual had a leadership role
should be the primary consideration, rather than the severity or scale of the crime.100
The SCSL has held that a review of “greatest responsibility” should consider
whether the accused was (1) a senior member of their particular group and (2) implicated
in serious crimes within the jurisdiction of the court.101 If so, they could be considered as
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those bearing the greatest responsibility. The fact that evidence may also identify others
who bear the greatest responsibility does not eliminate the accused’s liability or the
court’s competence over them.102
In the correspondence between the Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council, particular mention was made concerning the phrase, “including those
leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and
implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.”103 The correspondence suggests,
and the SCSL has held, that this part of the Statute is not a jurisdictional limitation. It is
to be understood simply as a guide to the prosecutor. An accused can still be found guilty
and within the jurisdiction of the SCSL even if he is not found to have threatened the
peace process.104
2.

The Prosecutor’s Interpretation

The purpose of the “greatest responsibility” language was to focus the prosecutor
on the key players in the conflict, but the phrase still offers the prosecutor considerable
discretion.105 In the SCSL, the prosecutor utilized the discretion very conservatively.
notebook at Tab 17]. When the court refers to the “jurisdiction of the court,” they are clearly referring to
the subject-matter and temporal restrictions.
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While “greatest responsibility” suggests very narrow jurisdiction, the prosecutor viewed
the language as a political compromise and narrowed it further, out of political and
financial considerations.106 Fearing that a large number of indictees under the Statute’s
mandate could threaten the stability of the region and the life of the court, the prosecutor
adopted an internal standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt” before issuing
indictments.107 This effectively limited the number of accused before the SCSL beyond
that required by the Statute.
There were also practical reasons for the narrow use of the prosecutor’s discretion.
Others who could be considered as bearing the greatest responsibility were found to be
deceased, incarcerated for other reasons, or assisting the prosecution as insider
witnesses.108 For this reason, the prosecution tended to indict only those who were
highest on the chain of command, rather than simply those who bore the greatest
responsibility.109 Though this method has been criticized, it is within the prosecutor’s
discretion to further limit the mandate as he sees fit.110
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It is important to note that the prosecution did not limit itself to indicting rebels and
soldiers blamed for starting the war and causing the most atrocities. The court is also
trying members of the Civil Defence Force (“CDF”), traditional hunting groups that
mobilized in order to defend the democratic government.111 The court is considering
whether they also bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes during the conflict.
The SCSL Statute specifically singles out peacekeepers and children under the age
of 15. Peacekeepers fall within the jurisdiction of their own countries.112 The SCSL is
not competent to try those who were under the age of 15 during the time of the crimes,
and has specific, limiting rules for trying those between the ages of 15-18.113 The need
for these sections suggests that the drafters were concerned that these groups could fall
within the jurisdiction of “greatest responsibility”. However, despite the fact that some
minors could fall within the jurisdiction of the SCSL, the prosecutor has decided that the
standard of “greatest responsibility” was too high to include minors.114
D.

THE SPECTRUM OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

In determining the scope of the ECCC’s personal jurisdiction, it is useful to
compare it to the jurisdictions of the other international criminal tribunals. The analysis
of the other courts helps us draw a spectrum of personal jurisdiction. On one end is the
ICC, which can prosecute all persons so long as the accused is connected to a member
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state of the Rome Statute or the Security Council uses its power to initiate an
investigation. On the opposite end is the SCSL, which limits its jurisdiction to those
bearing the greatest responsibility.
Considering the jurisdiction of the other courts, a possible spectrum may look
something like this:

The ad-hoc tribunals’ jurisdiction is narrower than the ICC’s, since they can only
prosecute those “responsible for serious violations” of international humanitarian law.
As discussed above, this is limited to those who committed crimes in connection with the
conflicts in either the former Yugoslavia for the ICTY, or Rwanda for the ICTR. Since
the overall personal jurisdiction is not much more limiting than that of the ICC, the
language used for the ad-hoc tribunals is jurisdictional similar to the ICC on the
spectrum, if slightly more limited.
The SCSL’s jurisdiction is limited to those who bear the “greatest responsibility”.
This language is much narrower than that of either the ICC or the ad-hoc tribunals. And
considering the way the prosecutor’s decision to narrow it even further, it has become a
very limiting jurisdictional element and belongs on the opposite side of the spectrum.
IV.

THE JURISDICTION OF THE ECCC
When the Cambodian government originally wrote to the U.N., it asked for

assistance in “bringing to justice those persons responsible” for the crimes of the
28

Democratic Kampuchea.115 This language echoes that of the ICTY and ICTR. Due to
concerns about a large number of indictees that language was changed. After long
negotiations, the language was modified until it reached its present form in the ECCC
Statute.
The ECCC Statute defines its personal jurisdiction in Article 2:
Extraordinary Chambers shall be established in the existing court structure, namely the
trial court and the supreme court to bring to trial senior leaders of Democratic
Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of
Cambodian laws related to crimes, international humanitarian law and custom, and
international conventions recognized by Cambodia.”116

The description essentially describes two classes of persons that are subject to the
ECCC’s jurisdiction: (1) senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and (2) those most
responsible for the crimes. These phrases have never been used to define an international
criminal tribunal’s personal jurisdiction before. However, the ICTY has considered
similar language in its Rule 11 bis.117
A.

SENIOR LEADERS OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

The jurisdictional requirement of “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea”
creates three elements that must be met in order for an individual to be prosecuted. The
person must: (1) hold a senior position in the military or government; (2) have a
leadership position (command responsibility); and (3) be a member of Democratic
Kampuchea. These elements will be considered in reverse order.
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1.

Democratic Kampuchea

The language clearly specifies a particular element of personal jurisdiction: namely
the individual’s affiliation with the Democratic Kampuchea. Only those who were
members of the Democratic Kampuchea can be tried under this part of the Statute. This
excludes the prosecution of non-Democratic Kampuchea actors, including other political
factions regardless of their involvement with the Democratic Kampuchea. It also
excludes Vietnamese and Thai officials who may have been involved.118
The SCSL, by comparison, does not have such a limitation. During the
establishment of the SCSL, President Kabbah of Sierra Leone initially requested the
Special Court to try “members of the Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”) and their
accomplices responsible for committing crimes.”119 The U.N. rejected this limitation,
and adopted the broader “greatest responsibility” language. While “greatest
responsibility” is very a narrow term, it did open up the court to prosecuting other actors
in the conflict. In the end, only five members of the RUF were indicted.120 While the
SCSL’s competence is theoretically narrower than the ECCC, it can encompass members
of other groups.121
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2.

Senior

The level a leader has in the chain of command is dependent on the hierarchy.
There is no specific legal jurisprudence that determines precisely what rank or title is
sufficient to be considered ‘senior’, especially considering differing definitions
depending on the country and context. This element has to be considered on a case-bycase basis using knowledge of the political and military leadership of the Khmer Rouge
and Democratic Kampuchea.
3.

Leaders

The term “leader” refers to an individual’s command responsibility. In the ICTY,
command responsibility is guided by Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute. Liability under
command responsibility can be both positive and negative. A commander can take a
positive action in ordering a subordinate to commit a crime. A commander can also be
liable for failing to prevent or punish crimes by subordinates. In order for the person to
be liable for negative command responsibility, there needs to be some obligation to act.122
Negative command responsibility has three elements: (1) there must exist a
superior-subordinate relationship; (2) the superior had mens rea – he knew or had reason
to know subordinates were committing or had committed crimes; and (3) the superior
failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish the perpetrators.123

v. Samuel Hinga Norman et al., Case No. SCSL-03-14-I, Indictment (5 February 2004) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 33].
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The superior-subordinate relationship applies to both de jure and de facto
authority.124 Thus, it extends beyond the military and civilian commanders to any
individual with superior authority.125 The converse is also true – the formal status of a
position does not automatically create command responsibility. The person must have
had actual power of control over the subordinates.126
The Group of Experts for Cambodia recognized that the term “leaders” should not
automatically be used to prosecute all persons at senior positions of the Democratic
Kampuchea or even the Communist Party of Kampuchea.127 This is because the list of
senior members may not necessarily correspond to a list of those most responsible for the
crimes committed. There may very well be senior leaders who had no knowledge or
control over the crimes, while others slightly below the senior level may have been very
actively involved.128
Under the “senior leaders” provision, the ECCC has jurisdiction over only those
individuals that were at the senior level of Democratic Kampuchea, and could be liable
for command responsibility. While the court is thus limited, it may still have competence
over others who bore de facto authority, or were lower-ranking members of Democratic
Kampuchea, through the “most responsible” jurisdiction.

124

Id. at ¶ 354.

125

Id. at ¶ 363.

126

Id. at ¶ 370.

127

Group of Experts, supra note 17 at ¶ 109 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4].

128

Id.

32

On the spectrum of personal jurisdiction, the “senior leaders” language could be
viewed as the most limiting. It is narrower than that of the SCSL:

B.

MOST RESPONSIBLE

The ECCC Statute’s use of the phrase, “those who were most responsible”129
suggests that the drafters did not intend the court to be limited to prosecuting only senior
leaders of Democratic Kampuchea. The Group of Experts recognized that many
individuals that were not in the charts of senior leaders may have played a significant role
in the atrocities: “This seems especially true with respect to certain leaders at the zonal
level, as well as officials of torture and interrogation centres such as Tuol Sleng.”130
The Group of Experts suggested that leaders at lower levels “who are directly
implicated in the most serious atrocities” should be prosecuted as most responsible.131 A
determination of command responsibility is again necessary to determine an individual’s
responsibility. The Group of Experts recognized this:
Military commanders and civilian leaders are criminally responsible in the obvious case
where they order atrocities and they are also generally responsible if they knew or should
have known that atrocities were being or about to be committed by their subordinates and
they failed to prevent, stop, or punish them. This would suggest the need to investigate
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the roles of those Khmer Rouge officials in responsible government positions with actual
or constructive knowledge of the atrocities.132

As discussed above, a determination must include whether a superior-subordinate
relationship exists, whether the superior fulfilled the mens rea requirements, and whether
the superior failed to take necessary steps to prevent the atrocities.133
Unlike the “senior leaders” jurisdiction, the “most responsible” jurisdiction allows
more room to prosecute de facto leaders. Any individual with leadership authority could
be considered a leader that bears command responsibility. This broader authority is
important for prosecuting mid-level commanders that acted as a link between the Central
Committee and those on the ground.134
The SCSL has already provided some discussion of the scope of “most
responsible”. The Secretary-General originally advocated for the use of the term “most
responsible” for the SCSL, rather than “greatest responsibility”. The Secretary-General
suggested that “most responsibility” should be understood to “denote both a leadership or
authority position of the accused, and a sense of the gravity, seriousness or massive scale
of the crime.”135 This would open the court’s competence to include not only political
and military leadership, but also those further down the line of command depending of
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the severity of the crime.136 This includes a determination not only of the formal position
of the suspect, but also the seriousness of the crime.
When the Security Council rejected the use of the phrase “most responsible” in
favor of “greatest responsibility”, it stated that doing so would be “limiting the focus of
the Special Court to those who played a leadership role.”137 The use of the word
“limiting” suggests that “most responsible” is broader than “greatest responsibility”.
The ICTY’s jurisprudence on Rule 11 bis offers a useful guide to determining
whether an accused is one of those “most responsible”. In determining who was “most
responsible”, the Todovic test can be used. As stated above, the Todovic test considers
the temporal scope, the geographic scope, the accused’s position, and the number of
victims.138
While the term “most responsible” does expand the jurisdiction beyond just those
senior leaders, it still excludes low-level commanders.139 In practice, only senior and
mid-level commanders should be prosecuted. While there is some political concern
about the number of possible indictees, there is also a risk that interpreting the phrase too
narrowly will hurt the prosecutor’s ability to trade insider witness testimony for leniency
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or impunity. Without a credible threat, many potential witnesses may not come
forward.140 Losing this ability may hurt the trials of the most important accused.
The phrase “most responsible” is narrower than the word “responsible” used by the
ad-hoc tribunals. “Most responsible” is also broader than “greatest responsibility” used
by the SCSL. Thus, on the spectrum of personal jurisdiction, it would fall between the
ad-hoc tribunals and the SCSL:

C.

THE LINK BETWEEN SENIOR LEADERS AND THOSE MOST
RESPONSIBLE

In interpreting Article 2 of the ECCC Statute, the defence may argue that the terms
“senior leaders” and “most responsible” are linked, as in they refer to senior leaders that
were most responsible. However, this argument does not pass muster.
The defence argument would be that “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and
those who were most responsible” suggests a link between the two terms. Essentially,
that the word ‘and’ requires that the accused must be both a senior leader and one who is
most responsible. This would greatly restrict the meaning of both phrases. A senior
leader would also have to be most responsible, and anyone deemed most responsible
would also have to be a senior leader.
140
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This argument would correspond closely to the ICTY’s Rule 11 bis, which connects
the two terms. As noted above, the ICTY Rule 11 bis concentrates on “the most senior
leaders suspected of being most responsible.”141 In determining whether an accused falls
within this category, the court looks at the gravity of the crimes charged and the level of
responsibility of the accused.142 The defence may argue that the ECCC’s language also
requires a similar analysis.
The clearest indication that the terms are not linked is the structure of the sentence
itself. ECCC Statute Article 2 provides competence over “senior leaders of Democratic
Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes committed.” The use of
the word ‘and’ here separates the two terms rather than connects them. If the purpose of
the sentence was to link the phrases, the words ‘and those’ would be eliminated to read,
“senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea who were most responsible.” Since it does not
read like this, it is clear that the terms are distinct.
The history of the ECCC’s establishment also suggests that the terms are separate.
The Group of Experts recommended that the tribunal should focus on “senior leaders
with responsibility over the abuses as well as those at lower levels who are directly
implicated in the most serious atrocities.”143 In fact, the phrase “most responsible” was
actually inserted specifically to allow for the prosecution of S-21 Chairman Duch and
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other high-ranking S-21 commanders.144 This strongly suggests that the phrase “most
responsible” was intended to be separate from “senior leaders” and must be interpreted to
extend to anyone that was most responsible, regardless of their position within the
Democratic Kampuchea hierarchy.145
In practice, all indictees that are senior leaders should also be most responsible, but
not all those most responsible must be senior leaders.
D.

MOVING FORWARD

While the scope of the term “most responsible” is technically wide enough to
include a variety of actors, the ECCC is probably still politically limited to prosecuting
members of the Democratic Kampuchea and Khmer Rouge only. The Group of Experts
recommends that the ECCC’s mandate only extend to Khmer Rouge members. This
recommendation was based on a request by the Cambodian Government.146
Like the SCSL, both the Cambodian government and the contributing States want to
keep the number of indictees low, to minimize expenses and political tension.147 It is
expected that the ECCC will focus on 10-15 individuals who were members of the
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Central Committee, the most feared physical perpetrators, or military and regional leaders
who enforced the policies.148
The largest problem facing the ECCC is the delay between the time of the crimes
and the trials. Many of the senior and intermediate level commanders have died in the
roughly 30 years since the crimes were committed. It has been estimated that no more
than roughly 60 individuals that could be considered “senior leaders” or “most
responsible” are still alive to stand trial.149 This may be why the “most responsible”
language was added to the “senior leaders” language.
Steven Heder and Brian Tittemore have compiled a list of seven candidates for
prosecution in the ECCC.150 One of them, Kae Pok, a member of the Central Committee,
has already died.151 Each one documented was a senior leader that could be considered
most responsible for the atrocities that occurred during the Democratic Kampuchea
regime.
E.

A NOTE ON CHILD SOLDIERS
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Given the difficulty in finding suspects to be prosecuted in the ECCC, it may be
tempting to try individuals who were child soldiers at the time of the crimes as those
“most responsible”. There is well documented evidence of the use of child soldiers in the
Khmer Rouge. It may even be possible that a child could fall within the jurisdiction of
the ECCC. However, there is a continuing practice of avoiding prosecution of minors.
The issue of child soldiers has not been raised in either the ICTY or ICTR. The
indictees before these tribunals have all been middle-aged men, none of whom was under
the age of 18 at the time of the crime.152 The ICC limits its jurisdiction to those over the
age of 18 at the time of the crime.153 It has been suggested that a child under the age of
18 does not have the mental capacity to fulfill the mens rea requirement of any crimes
under the jurisdiction of the ICC.154
The issue was heavily debated in establishing the SCSL.155 The war in Sierra
Leone was infamous for the use of child soldiers. In discussing the possibility of trying
them at the SCSL, the Secretary-General said, “Though feared by many for their
brutality, most if not all of these children have been subjected to a process of
psychological and physical abuse and duress which has transformed them from victims
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into perpetrators.”156 In response to concerns held by the government of Sierra Leone,
the jurisdiction was broadened to allow for the prosecution of children, but with
limitations.157 The SCSL’s jurisdiction is limited to those over the age of 15 at the time
of the crime and adds procedural limitations for those between 15 and 18.158 While the
jurisdiction of the SCSL could encompass child soldiers, the prosecutor instead used his
discretion to decide that no child’s acts could fall within the personal jurisdiction of the
SCSL.159
The Group of Experts also touched on the issue. They suggested that child soldiers
should not be tried before the ECCC.160 For these reasons, child soldiers should not be
indicted in the ECCC.
V.

CONCLUSION
The terms “senior leaders” and “most responsible” codified in Article 2 of the

ECCC Statute are limiting terms of personal jurisdiction. As such, the ECCC only has
competence to prosecute individuals that fall into one of those categories. The
interpretation of personal jurisdiction will ultimately rest with the ECCC chambers. This
is especially true since it is currently the only tribunal using these phrases to define its
personal jurisdiction.
156

The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for
Sierra Leone, delivered to the Security Council, ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (4 Oct. 2000) [reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 6].
157

Schabas, supra note 64 at 141.

158

SCSL Statute, supra note 7 at Art. 7 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

159

Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Special Court Prosecutor Says He Will Not Prosecute
Children (2 November 2002) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 63].

160

Group of Experts, supra note 17 at ¶ 106 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4].

41

The ECCC’s personal jurisdiction relates to “senior leaders” and those “most
responsible” for the atrocities. This allows for a broader scope of indictees to be
prosecuted before the chambers. Senior leaders include those who were high ranking
members of the Democratic Kampuchea and was likely intended to mean members of the
Central Committee. Regardless of their rank, they must have had command
responsibility over the atrocities committed.
The phrase “most responsible” allows for the prosecution of lower level leaders.
This phrase is broader than the “greatest responsibility” terminology used in the SCSL. It
allows for a wider range of indictees, but is still probably limited to those who were
members of the Khmer Rouge. In determining whether someone is most responsible, it
will be useful to consider the Todovic test developed in the ICTY.
Comparing the ECCC’s language to the spectrum of personal jurisdiction in the
international criminal tribunals will help facilitate an understanding of who is a senior
leader or most responsible. Initially it will fall to the prosecutor to determine who falls in
these categories, but it is subject to judicial review. The chambers will decide the issue at
the end of the trial, after the evidence has been presented.
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